Employers must determine the types of health care plans to offer and also set employee premiums for each plan provided. Depending on the structure of the employee share of premiums across different health insurance plans, the incentives to choose one plan over another are altered. If employees know premiums do not fully reflect the risk differences among workers, such pricing can give rise to a so-called ''death spiral'' due to adverse selection. This paper uses longitudinal information from a natural experiment in the management of health benefits for a large employer to explore the impact of moving from a fixed-dollar contribution policy to a partially risk-adjusted employer contribution policy. Our results show that implementing a significant risk adjustment had no discernable effect on adverse selection against the most generous indemnity insurance policy. This stands in stark contrast to previous studies, which have tended to estimate large impacts attributed to selection when employers move to a fixed-dollar policy from one with some risk adjustment. Further analysis suggests that previous studies, which appeared to detect plans in the throes of a death spiral, may instead have been reflecting an inexorable movement away from a non-preferred product, one that would have been inefficient for nearly all workers even in the absence of adverse selection.
Death Spiral or Euthanasia? The Demise of Generous Group Health Insurance Coverage
Employers must determine the types of health care plans to offer and also set employee premiums for each plan provided. Depending on the structure of the employee share of premiums across different health insurance plans, the incentives to choose one plan over another are altered. If employees know premiums do not fully reflect the risk differences among workers, such pricing can give rise to a so-called ''death spiral'' due to adverse selection. This paper uses longitudinal information from a natural experiment in the management of health benefits for a large employer to explore the impact of moving from a fixed-dollar contribution policy to a partially risk-adjusted employer contribution policy. Our results show that implementing a significant risk adjustment had no discernable effect on adverse selection against the most generous indemnity insurance policy. This stands in stark contrast to previous studies, which have tended to estimate large impacts attributed to selection when employers move to a fixed-dollar policy from one with some risk adjustment. Further analysis suggests that previous studies, which appeared to detect plans in the throes of a death spiral, may instead have been reflecting an inexorable movement away from a non-preferred product, one that would have been inefficient for nearly all workers even in the absence of adverse selection.
Companies often offer employees an opportunity to select a health insurance plan from a menu of choices in group benefits settings. Inasmuch as health care plans differ in coverage and premiums, plan sponsors must decide how to structure the out-of-pocket premiums that employees pay, since those premiums alter the incentives to choose one plan over another. One common strategy follows a ''fixed-dollar contribution'' model, in which the employer nominally ''credits'' each employee with the same fixed level of (tax-shielded) compensation dollars (sometimes adjusted for worker-only versus family coverage) that can be used toward any experience-rated or self-insured plan purchase. Under this model, plan-specific premium differentials paid by employees then are set to reflect differences in average costs per enrollee across plans (Enthoven 1980) . If all workers were of approximately the same risk level, employee choice given such premium differentials would (ideally) reflect differences in the value that workers place on the benefits associated with each plan. Taking account of the true incremental costs of one plan over others, workers then would select efficiently the plans that gave them the highest net benefits. Conversely, plans would have an incentive to add benefits if they could command a price addition high enough to cover their extra costs. These attractive properties may erode, however, when workers know they differ by risk level, but premiums charged to employees do not reflect these individual risk differences. 1 Uniform incremental premiums for employees of different risks will give rise to greater adverse selection (other things equal) if higher-risk employees conclude that the relative benefits expected from more generous plans exceed the incremental premiums they pay out of pocket, while lower-risk employees come to the opposite conclusion.
In a fixed-dollar contribution (or ''flat rate'') world, higher-risk employees (and those with higher-risk families) would be predicted to enroll differentially in more generous health care plans. Some lower-risk employees, by contrast, would choose cheaper plans even if they attached relatively high net values to the richer benefits the generous plans provided. Compared to other methods, the fixed-dollar method is predicted to lead over time to ''erosion,'' a shrinking market share for the more generous plan.
The fundamental cause of adverse selection-that is, higher enrollment of those in poorer health-is improper pricing of insurance options. For the most efficient choices, each employee at each level of risk should face a different premium for the more generous plan-a premium that reflects the incremental expected claims cost for that risk level. But this generally is difficult to do even when employers might want to do it, both because (for administrative reasons) the incremental out-of-pocket premium that they charge takes on the same value for a wide range of risks (so the price will always be wrong for the infra-marginal risks), and because the realized post-selection difference in expected benefits in the fixed-dollar model is not an accurate measure of the difference in expected costs for the average risk person in the workforce.
Specifically, under the simple fixed-dollar approach, employers set incremental employee premiums for each plan proportional to the average incremental claims costs associated with participants who actually elect that plan. This premium, in turn, may drive more low-risk enrollees away, requiring a recalculation of the differential to a higher level, and potentially resulting in what has come to be known as a ''death spiral'' (cf. Price and Mays 1985; Buchmueller and Feldstein 1997; Buchmueller and DiNardo 2002; Cutler and Zeckhauser 1998) . Even if an (interior) equilibrium is reached, it will be one where enrollment in generous plans will be lower than it would have been had differential premiums been risk-adjusted in some fashion.
A number of recent studies reported cases in some large organizations where a fixeddollar premium-setting policy largely replaced an alternative policy that risk-adjusted premiums to some extent; these studies predicted or found adverse selection against more generous plans. The estimated effects of substituting one policy for another are quantitatively important (Cutler and Reber 1998; Cutler and Zeckhauser 2000; Buchmueller and Feldstein 1997) . Greater concern about adverse selection against generous coverage plans has been associated recently with an increasing number of employers offering high-deductible ''consumer-directed'' options (Zabinski et al. 1999; Pauly and Herring 2000) , financed in the fixed-dollar fashion.
One way to deter a health insurance plan death spiral might be to set the predetermined employer contribution in a risk-adjusted fashion, which in turn will influence employee premium differentials. The argument is that such risk adjustment takes account of the risk levels of those who choose a plan, thus perhaps becoming both more equitable and more efficient than permitting the premium differential to reflect average benefit costs arising from equilibrium plan choices. For example, a plan that attracted a disproportionate number of low risks would have a lower premium level than if it attracted a random slice of the workforce.
To date, no economic study has explored how effective practical risk adjustment is in tempering adverse selection behavior in the group health insurance context. 2 Rather, prior research typically has examined the effects of introducing ''fixed-dollar'' models in situations in which either premium differentials did not exist previously, or employer premium contributions were proportional to the total premium (Price and Mays 1985; Buchmueller and Feldstein 1997; Cutler and Reber 1998) . These studies indicated that high-risk plans lost enrollment, and concluded forthwith that the results were consistent with inefficient adverse selection.
In this paper, we ask whether erosion of the generous plan share necessarily means that adverse selection is at work, and whether explicit efforts at risk adjustment always will help stem erosion. The usual advice is that ''an actuarial system for adjusting premiums may be necessary to avoid premium spirals'' (Price and Mays 1985, p.76) . We explore whether instituting such an adjustment system actually avoids premium spirals, and, by implication, whether premium spirals are always caused by unadjusted premiums and adverse selection. Specifically, we provide an empirical example of a situation where, initially, evidence indicated that a fixed-dollar contribution policy had led to adverse selection against a generous plan (so that the market share of that plan was eroding), and pricing probably contributed to adverse selection (with evidence that lower risks were disproportionately choosing plans other than the generous one). However, in our example, a serious attempt to correct this problem through explicit (though not perfect) risk adjustment of employer contributions proved completely ineffective.
The setting was a ''natural experiment'' in the management of health benefits for a large nonprofit educational institution, where two changes were made: 1) a formal (though imperfect) risk-adjusted employer contribution approach was substituted for what had been roughly a fixed-dollar contribution; and then, over time, 2) the risk-adjusted contribution approach was held nearly constant. As is often true, this natural experiment was not perfectly clean; while the most generous plan contained the same coverage provisions and was offered continuously over the period of observation, there were some changes in the coverage provisions of less generous plans. Nevertheless, there was a period of time during which the major change was the introduction of risk adjustment into plan premium differentials. Accordingly, we have the opportunity to observe the mirror image experience from other studies; namely, we see what happens when (partial) risk adjustment is adopted in place of a fixed-contribution strategy, and we also can evaluate the continuing effect of risk adjustment over time. We must adjust results for the new plan offerings, which adds some imprecision, but those effects seem to be minor in any case. Our results suggest that, in this case, implementation of significant risk adjustment had no apparent effect (controlling for trend and other influences) on shrinkage of the market share of the generous, low-deductible indemnity insurance policy. This stands in stark contrast to previous studies that have argued that introducing risk-adjusted premium pricing is likely to produce major shifts in plan shares, or even a death spiral.
In what follows, we first show that enrollment movements at this employer support an empirical ''no effect'' hypothesis. Next, we provide analysis that seeks to explain why results from earlier studies might not apply here. We suggest that there could have been other reasons why people left the generous plan, so that evidence of the erosion of market share of a more generous option does not imply that adverse selection was necessarily the cause. In our context, we hypothesize (and offer reasons to believe) that employees' preferences already were shifting away from the generous indemnity plan and toward less costly, but high-value managed care plans, even before risk adjustment was introduced. After suggesting some reasons why employee plan preferences may have changed, we conclude that what seemed to be the throes of a death spiral was, in this case, an inexorable shift away from a non-preferred plan-a plan that would have become inefficient (relative to the other options) for nearly all workers, regardless of risk, and even in the absence of adverse selection. In other words, observed erosion in the market share of the plan chosen by higher risks may not necessarily be attributable to inefficient adverse selection, and hence observation of such shrinkage does not constitute proof of adverse selection.
This paper is not intended as a critique of the theory of adverse selection or of the possibility that it could be found in some settings. Rather, we consider the common reverse inference-that the shrinkage of a more generous plan provides prima facie evidence that adverse selection exists and has worsened.
The Natural Experiment
The employer in question, a large East Coast educational institution, had long offered a choice of health insurance options to its approximately 10,000 nonunionized employees. Historically, the most popular choice had been a traditional indemnity-type fee-forservice (FFS) plan that (at one time) had a $100 deductible for employee-only coverage; hence it became known as ''Plan 100'' (even after the deductible rose). This plan was effectively self-insured. The basic plan was explicitly self-insured, and the major medical component was experience-rated, with annual total major medical costs per worker a function of the plan-specific enrollees' claims experienced in the previous year. Above a deductible, Plan 100 paid the usual 80% of approved outpatient charges and full inpatient charges; over time, it gradually added outpatient, mental health, and prescription drug coverage. The employer also offered health maintenance organization (HMO) coverage from the two largest HMOs in the area: an Aetna HMO and a Keystone (Blue Cross/Blue Shield [BC/BS]) health plan. 3 The Keystone plan was self-insured and the Aetna plan experience-rated. Over the early 1990s, the two large HMOs gradually increased their share of the employee group; the decline in Plan 100's share accelerated in FY1996 (beginning July 1995) when the sponsor added ''P-Care,'' a preferred provider organization (PPO) linked to the employer's health care system, which was heavily patronized by employees. P-Care offered a lower premium and smaller innetwork copayments than Plan 100, but its out-of-network benefits had cost-sharing comparable to that of Plan 100; patients, however, were liable for the cost and the paperwork burden if the charges from out-of-network providers exceeded the plan's allowance.
Initially, and into the mid-1990s, the employer implemented an approximated fixed-dollar contribution model for each plan by employee rating class (single or family coverage). That is, the variation in employee premiums across plans roughly tracked the variation in total expenditures per enrollee across all plans. 4 In the mid-1990s, the employer began to worry that adverse selection (or at least risk-based selection) was occurring. Plan 100 clearly was attracting older employees and those with longer periods of employment (principally tenured faculty), while new hires were choosing options other than Plan 100. As a consequence of the fall in average managed care premiums relative to the Plan 100 premium, the employee out-of-pocket contributions for managed care plans went to zero or even became slightly negative (this meant more benefit dollars for workers' other cafeteria plan choices). 5 Table 1 compares the time trend in Plan 100 premiums with a simple average of the premiums for other plans, showing both absolute and relative differences over the 11-year period under study.
Midway through the decade, and after the PPO option had been available for two years, a consulting firm recommended that the plan sponsor restructure employee premiums to offset risk-related plan-specific claims experience-in other words, to implement strong risk adjustment. The risk-adjustment mechanism took account of some important predictors of expected expense. In particular, the consultant estimated what total premiums for each plan would have been if all plan members had the average insured worker risk characteristics (varying only by age, sex, and wage level). These ''risk-adjusted'' total premiums were set to cover expected aggregate costs for the self-insured plans, and the expected premiums for the Aetna HMO. The sponsor's contribution to this total risk-adjusted premium then was set at a uniform dollar amount based on the sponsor's target budget for health benefits; the employee's out-ofpocket contribution was the difference between the estimated total risk-adjusted premium and the employer's actual (uniform) contribution. Since the total premiums were risk-adjusted, so were the differentials. That is, after the change, plans that enrolled disproportionately large numbers of older workers had lower employee premium differentials than they had under the fixed-dollar approach. While this kind of incomplete risk adjustment should not have been expected to stop all selection-based erosion, it was anticipated to have an effect on the generous plan share.
The new approach substantially altered the employer's estimates of total relative plan premiums. For example, in FY1997, the combined (employer and employee) monthly premium for the Aetna plan was figured at $302 per month for family coverage, whereas, after the risk adjustment in FY1998, monthly premiums jumped to $428. By contrast, the Plan 100 total monthly premium fell from an unadjusted FY1997 value of $521 to a riskadjusted FY1998 value of $462. (For single employees, the changes were of similar relative magnitudes.) After applying the university's policies for determining the explicit employee premium relative to new total premium estimates, the amounts charged to employees differed dramatically from what they would have been in the absence of the change. The Plan 100 employee premium in FY1998 barely rose (for both individual and family coverage) compared to the year before, whereas the employee premiums for all other options went from zero or negative amounts to significant positive amounts. Thus the reforms resulted in dramatic changes relative to Plan 100 employee premium differentials. Specifically, all plans except Plan 100 had been provided at a near-zero employee premium prior to the change; afterward, the average relative employee premiums for the managed care plans rose to, and remained at, about 30% of the Plan 100 rate (see Table 1 ). Thus adoption of the new risk-adjustment policy that took demographic risk factors into account substantially changed relative premiums and is consistent with the evidence mentioned earlier that Plan 100 was selected differentially by higher (demographic) risks.
This change was rationalized by the consultant primarily for noneconomic, normative reasons deemed particularly important in the health insurance arena. On fairness grounds, the consultant contended that older and sicker employees who elected Plan 100 should not be asked to pay for the higher costs associated with their own higher risk. In the discussion between the consultant and the university administration, little attention was Table 1 . Time pattern of monthly premium levels and differences Fiscal year 1991 Fiscal year 1992 Fiscal year 1993 Fiscal year 1994 Fiscal year 1995 Fiscal year 1996 Fiscal year 1997 Fiscal year 1998 Fiscal year 1999 Fiscal year 2000 Fiscal year 2001 
Worker only
Plan 100 given to the role of health care benefits in attracting and retaining high-quality workers, or to minimizing overall labor costs. There was also little critical analysis of equity issues, even though Plan 100 members were more likely to be highly paid senior staff, while HMO members were lower-wage employees. 6 In the year of the reform (FY1998), a new point-of-service plan (U-POS) was added to the choice menu; this was a gatekeeper pointof-service HMO linked to the employer's health system that also included a broader HMO network with higher copayments for out-of-network use. Its employee premium was set at half the employee premium for the old P-Care plan. The average premium for alternatives to Plan 100 rose even with inclusion of this plan's premium. Not long thereafter, the employer engaged a different consulting firm, which introduced a new approach and philosophy for employee health care plan premiums. Rather than continue to risk-adjust premiums in tandem with changes in the mix of risks, relative premiums essentially were frozen for the next three years. This provided us sufficient time to observe gradual adjustments to the onetime relative premium change. As the overall benefits bill rose, the relative differential of Plan 100 rose modestly. The Aetna and Keystone employee premiums continued to be identical.
What Difference Do Risk-Adjusted Employee Premiums Make?
The risk-adjustment approach recommended by the first consultants was intended to stop what was perceived as a ''death spiral'' in the making. Though it might not have been fully effective, it was expected to at least slow the decrease in the Plan 100 enrollment share. Nevertheless, as Figures 1 and 2 show, enrollment percentages in Plan 100 fell at a steady rate over time, both before and after the introduction of the new premium pricing philosophy in FY1998. This is despite the increases in relative Plan 100 premiums from FY1991 up to FY1998, and then the dramatic and permanent reduction in Plan 100's relative premiums after that point. In FY2002, the plan sponsor froze further enrollment in Plan 100, responding to low membership, and it also boosted the employee premium substantially. Eventually, due to low enrollment, Plan 100 was discontinued as an option in the 2005 fiscal year. In total, the trends offer little support for the hypothesis that enrollment patterns were interrupted by the risk-adjusted health care insurance premium ''reforms. '' In what follows, we use several empirical strategies to evaluate more rigorously some key questions about these trends: 1) Were employees of this firm particularly unresponsive to relative premiums, perhaps less responsive than those studied by other researchers? 2) Was something else changing over time that might have affected plan choice? 3) After the reform, did the trend in, or level of, average risk in the more generous plan fall, as would be consistent with a reversal of adverse selection? Fourth, and most importantly, can we distinguish between the hypothesis of a gradual shift in demand away from the most generous plan and the hypothesis of a death spiral induced by adverse selection?
A Modeling Approach
One puzzle on which we focus is why there was so little apparent reaction to the riskbased ''reform'' that produced a large decline in relative employee premiums for Plan 100, the old FFS plan offering, compared to the other plans. Indeed, after the reform, almost no new hires (who were on average much younger than continuing employees) joined Plan 100, and there was no slowdown in the rate at which previously enrolled participants exited over time. What can this teach us about adverse selection and death spirals? 7 To illuminate this question, we define an ''empirical death spiral'' in a multiple-option group insurance setting as a situation in which, over time, a plan disproportionately chosen by higher risks: a) loses membership, and b) experiences an increasing average level of risk. (Conversely, reversing adverse selection should lead to a slowdown or reversal in erosion of share and/or reduction in relative risk.) Both clauses of this definition are important. The first provides an informal definition of a death spiral, yet it does not rule out the possibility that a plan might lose membership for other reasons. For instance, given changes in plan costs for someone of average risk and changes in demand, a plan type might become less popular irrespective of the risk levels of those who tend to select it. The second clause indicates that even if the relative employee premium perfectly reflects differences in risk at one point in time, workers above average risk still might move away from the plan over a period if its costs were to rise disproportionately or if other plans were introduced that were more attractive for other reasons (e.g., lower copays).
These observations raise an important concern that thus far has been implicit in the insurance selection literature, namely, what is the counterfactual or null hypothesis when testing whether a plan is losing membership because of an adverse-selection death spiral? One conceptually attractive counterfactual would be to ask what would have happened if premiums had been perfectly risk-rated. Of course, in such a situation, there would be no adverse selection. Yet many prior studies have not used this benchmark. Rather, they seem to have another, more restrictive (or more idealistic) benchmark in mind, one in which people initially would be distributed independently of risk across different types of plans (Robinson et al. 1991; Martin, Rogal, and Arnold 2004) .
Martin, Rogal, and Arnold say, ''Adverse selection occurs when a disproportionate number of people at increased medical risk enroll in a particular health plan'' (p. 1). This second benchmark is more restrictive because it ignores the real possibility that it could be efficient for higher risks to be disproportionately in one type of plan rather than another, even in a perfectly risk-rated world. For example, evidence from the risk-rated individual insurance market suggests that older buyers are less likely to choose HMOs or restrictive PPOs relative to less restrictive indemnity plans (Herring and Pauly 2006) . The theoretical example of adverse selection discussed in Cutler and Zeckhauser (2000) is one in which the efficient allocation is for risk types to be segregated into different plans, a generous plan for the high risks and a limited plan for the low risks; adverse selection leads to them all falling into the less generous plan.
Empirical modeling in this area has posited that people do move across plans in response to employee premium differences. The most common way of testing the proposition, which we follow here, assumes that the probability that an employee chooses a particular plan in a given time period depends on the difference (measured in various ways) between that plan's employee premium and the premiums charged in other plans (Barringer and Mitchell 1994; Feldman et al. 1989) . A second tactic relates the probability of switching out of one's current plan at a given time to the change in the premium difference between that period and a previous one (Beaulieu 2002) . We do not pursue the latter approach here, as it is less general; it ignores new hires, and it does not consider the destination of the switchers.
In what follows, we formally test the hypothesis that the rate of decline in Plan 100's share was not appreciably affected by the dramatic reform entailing a sizable change in the relative premium enacted in FY1998. To undertake this test, we estimate logit regressions using plan choice data for approximately 65,800 person-years over the period FY1993-FY2001. As noted, over part of this time, only two plan types (the FFS and virtually identical HMOs) were offered; later a PPO and a POS plan were added. First, we estimate a binary logit model where the dependent variable takes on a value of one if the person was in Plan 100, and zero if the person was in any other plan. Second, we also provide a generalized multinomial logit model that differentiates among the multiple types of alternatives to Plan 100 available after FY1996.
Explanatory variables of interest include a measure of the tax exclusion-adjusted difference in premiums between Plan 100 and (in the simple logit version) the average of all other premiums in the family/individual category selected. We also include a time trend variable to test for a secular shift in preferences away from Plan 100, as well as a count of the number of managed care plans offered. Over this period, there was no significant change in the coverage provisions of health care policies offered, other than the mechanical fact that the dollar amount of the cost-sharing in Plan 100 grew proportionately as health spending grew, while HMO copayments increased less predictably. Separate and identical drug coverage was added to all plans. The Plan 100 deductible was adjusted upward several times by modest amounts. In addition to the annual change in gross employee premiums, which were sometimes substantial, implicit employee premiums varied for another reason. Since employees earned different salaries and therefore would pay different marginal tax rates on the tax shielded income, workers' health care insurance premiums would vary by salary, by marital category, and by income.
Specifying the Price of Health Insurance
To develop an accurate empirical definition of the employees' ''price'' of Plan 100 versus the price of alternative plans, we compute the tax-adjusted absolute difference in premiums (DP) between the Plan 100 employee premium and the average premium for the alternatives for the type of insurance (family or self-only) actually chosen by the employee. Since the explicit employee premium is paid out of pre-tax dollars in a cafeteria plan, the net premium differential is multiplied by (1m), where m is the estimated employee marginal tax rate (following Cutler and Reber 1998). 8 In what follows, we assume that the worker's wage from this employer proxies household annual income, and therefore (as in Cutler and Reber) measures variation in marginal tax rates across workers (albeit imperfectly). The variation in the net health premium across workers for a given plan in a given year is (inversely) correlated with total earnings, since only the ''steps'' in the tax structure make correlation less than perfect. Accordingly, it may be difficult to estimate separately premium and salary effects. Alternatively, we could have specified the price measure as the proportional differences in the cross-plan employee premium differentials, in which case the marginal tax rate would drop out: a $10 increase in a $100 differential would be a 10% increase for all workers facing this set of circumstances regardless of the individual worker's marginal tax rate. Of course, this alternative price definition does not vary with income or earnings, so there would be much less cross-sectional price variability since the differentials would be the same for all workers choosing a particular type of plan (individual or family) in a given year. While we have no a priori basis for preferring one functional form to another, preliminary analysis based on the tax-adjusted measure yielded better goodness-of-fit than that based on the relative price measure, so we display results based on the former specification.
Empirical Findings
The first logit regression model we estimate takes the form (suppressing time and individual subscripts):
where, besides the premium differential (DP) and the time trend (t), we control for the worker's age and salary, whether he or she was a new hire (N), and the number of years worked at the firm (Tenure). In addition, the worker's policy type (F 5 family versus single) is included. All relevant variables that vary over time also are taken into account. Of most importance is an indicator of when the health care pricing reform was adopted, R, which also is interacted with the premium difference variable because the prominence given to the reform in employee communications might have caused workers to consider choices and relative prices more seriously than before the reform. All variables are described in Table 2 . Regression coefficients are reported in Table 3 . With the large sample size (more than 65,800 observations), all regression coefficients are statistically significant at conventional levels. The results indicate that employee relative premiums are related negatively to the demand for Plan 100, and this effect was larger in absolute value for new employees and after the reform was implemented; it also was larger for single coverage than for family coverage. Of key interest for our purposes is the fact that the coefficient on the time trend indicates a long-term (initial and persistent) movement away from Plan 100, even after holding constant the premium differential and other factors. The reform binary (R) is also significant and negative: rather than inducing more people into Plan 100, the reform was associated with an acceleration in the rate of erosion in that plan's market share. Furthermore, the interaction term (RP 5 R * DP) indicates that the absolute value of the price coefficient actually increased between the two time periods (though the change was small).
We also explore some generalized logit models that account for the availability of more than two options after FY1996; as the results are similar, we report only the unordered results. From 1996 to 2001, employees had three sets of options: Plan 100, the two nearly identical HMOs, and the PPO/ POS option (which melded P-Care first offered in FY1996 and the POS plan offered from FY1998 onward). The latter two plan types were also quite similar; the primary difference was that P-Care had lower deductibles and coinsurance than did the POS plan for out-of-network self-referred care ($300 vs. $500, and 80% coinsurance vs. 70%). We chose this approximation since most insureds in these plans used within-network care and enrollment in the POS plan remained small. As a sensitivity check, we also estimate the simple logit model for the period from FY1996 onward, and we find that results for this time period are very similar with a trend against Plan 100 and some price sensitivity.
Findings from the generalized logit model appear in Table 4 . Now, Plan 100 is treated as the ''base'' option, so the signs are reversed from the previous results. The main coefficient of interest, the time trend shifting away from Plan 100, remains, although we cannot test whether that shift became more pronounced after reform since we have only two pre-reform years. One novel result from this more elaborate specification (though it is not especially relevant to our story on the Plan 100 death spiral) is that employees were significantly affected by the Plan 100 vs. PPO/POS price differential in choosing between Plan 100 and those plans. In contrast, the price differential is not statistically significant in the Plan 100 vs. HMO choice (though the trend remains). A plausible interpretation is that to the extent employees were motivated by price differentials, they tended to pay more attention to the differential between Plan 100's premium and closer substitutes, the PPO/POS plans.
Risk Levels and Post-Reform Outcome
As noted previously, adverse selection against a generous health insurance plan not only implies that this plan can lose market share, but also that those who remain in the plan tend to be of high average risk. Reversing adverse selection therefore should tend to lower the risk level in the more generous plan. Indeed, in a simple Rothschild-Stiglitz tworisk-class model, all of the high risks are already in the generous plan, so any new enrollment in that plan in response to a corrective price reduction must consist entirely of lower risks. 9 In a more general model, there can be high-risk employees with low risk aversion who may have chosen the less generous plan initially, so a price reduction would attract a mixed-risk population; however, those added still should be of lower average risk than the initial enrollees in the more generous plan.
Since the employer in this study did not have access to disaggregated claims data when designing its pricing policy, it could not estimate a formal risk prediction model. Other research shows that, other things equal, older people are higher risk than younger people, especially for those over age 50 relative to younger people (for both sexes; Pauly and Herring 1999; Herring and Pauly 2006) . We therefore examine an interacted specification to see whether the reform's price reduction or the binary variable for the postreform time period has a different effect on the choice of Plan 100 for older vs. younger workers. Neither interaction is statistically significant. Since the interpretation of interaction terms in categorical models is not straightforward (Ai and Norton 2003) , we emphasize that the estimated size of the interaction is quite small. Using Ai and Norton's suggested procedure, there is no statistically significant age-related interaction over any part of the range of the price variable. Accordingly, we conclude that the impact of the reform does not look like a reversal of adverse selection.
Finally, we examine the pattern over time in the average age (as an important compo- nent of risk) for people enrolling in Plan 100 relative to the other plans as an indicator of adverse selection and its correction. Table 5 shows the mean employee age among workers selecting either the worker-only or family plan, and the ratio of the average age among those choosing Plan 100 to the average age of those selecting the other plans over time. The trend before the FY1998 reform does not suggest an overall death spiral; the age ratio did rise slightly for self-only coverage, but it fell (by a larger amount) for family coverage.
What is more striking is that for both types of plans, the relative age in Plan 100 fell after the FY1998 reform, which implies that the outflow briefly switched to one with fewer young lower-risk individuals. While we do not make too much of this small change in relative risk, it does seem that the outflow after the reform cannot be attributed to a continuation of a death spiral against Plan 100 (if indeed one had been in place). Rather, it represented a continued shift against the plan independent of observable changes in risk composition.
Simulations
To illustrate our estimated price effects more clearly, we convert the logit effects from Table 3 into elasticity terms. The implied elasticity is approximately 2.78, implying that this firm's employees do not differ much from those in other studies. For example, to compare our results to Cutler and Reber (who use the log of DP), we re-estimated our model using their price variable. The price elasticity point estimate of 2.3 is well within Cutler and Reber's range of 2.3 to 2.6. Clearly, our elasticity results suggest that the behavior of this firm's employees is not atypical. The most important influence on Plan 100's share is the time trend; the (log) odds of being in that plan fell by almost 20% (.17) year after year. Perhaps more importantly, this decline proceeded at an accelerated pace in the post-reform period, more than doubling in magnitude. Naturally, this leads us to ask what difference it made to dramatically change premium risk adjustments. One way to answer this question is to forecast what would have happened to the premium difference in the absence of reform, and then to evaluate what the predicted market share might have been. Because there was relatively little change in the relative premium difference after the reform, we focus on estimating the short-run effect.
To determine the effect of the premium reforms per se on enrollment, we simulate what would have happened to Plan 100 enrollments in years after the reform had the premium differential been set at the (higher) level consistent with previous policy. Accordingly, we assume that the ratio of the Plan 100 premium to the average of other premiums over the next five years remained at its 1997 value. We then use the logit regression coefficients to predict the Plan 100 market share in each future period, taking account of the direct effect of prices and their interaction with time. 10 Figure 3 shows the estimated time path of Plan 100 enrollment under this scenario, vs. its actual time path. Evidently, enrollment in Plan 100 would have been somewhat lower than what actually was experienced, especially immediately after the relative premium increase. The figure then shows that the reform delayed the decline in market share for only a short time. Indeed, by mid-2000, the share would have been virtually the same with or without the reform. The figure also indicates what would have happened had tastes not shifted against Plan 100 at about the same time as the reform. This difference is somewhat more durable, but it still converges to a very small fraction after four years.
Discussion and Conclusions
It is worth noting that employees in the health insurance plans studied here did respond to premium differentials over time; the employees were certainly not inert. To the extent that the employer felt that higher risks were concentrated in Plan 100, drawing on the estimated price elasticities, it would have been sensible to expect-as in much of the literature-that risk adjustment of premiums would have reduced this selection and slowed erosion of the share of the more generous plan. Yet what we observe empirically is that a reform intended to do just that did not work in the expected way. The FFS plan's market share continued to drop after the pricing change designed to make it more attractive in terms of price. It appears that this price-induced corrective was more than offset by a coincident additional shift in demand away from this plan type. We do not know precisely why the relative attractiveness of the benefits offered by the other plans continued to increase. We hypothesize that, in this particular case study, the problem was not that adverse selection against a generous indemnity plan did not exist, but that attempts to correct it were overtaken by the march of time. (Swartz and Garnick [2000] come to a similar conclusion about apparent adverse selection in New Jersey.) The shift away from Plan 100, for reasons independent of the price differential, accelerated after the reform and continued at a rapid pace even after the options stabilized. So it does not appear that the change in options can explain the trend against Plan 100. (The POS plan added after the reform attracted only a small total enrollment.) More to the conceptual point, since P-Care was more generous than Plan 100 for in-network care and not less generous in nominal coverage for out-of-network use, selection into P-Care would not properly be called ''adverse.'' We therefore hypothesize, though we cannot conclusively prove, that demand shifted to alternatives other than Plan 100 because the managed care alternatives were perceived as offering a greater net benefit. This was the period (before the backlash) in which demand in the national group insurance market strongly shifted to managed care plans, even in single-option self-insured group insurance settings where there were no multiple plan offerings and therefore no likelihood of adverse selection. Inasmuch as this was happening nationwide, workers in our setting probably were experiencing the same changes in tastes in favor of HMOs, relative to traditional indemnity plans. While many hypotheses might account for Plan 100's demise, our preferred explanation is that people shifted to choices with higher net benefits or more value for money. The other health insurance plans increasingly grew to be perceived as a better deal for all risk levels. New hires increasingly were likely to choose something other than Plan 100, compared to existing employees, which suggests that inertia was the primary factor holding people in the old indemnity plan, rather than its inherent attraction to high risks. We can rule out changes in the nature of the benefits; with the exceptions for inflation noted earlier (which also affected PPO/POS), a careful examination of plan provisions shows no significant changes in Plan 100 coverage relative to the others. Finally, and to us, the most telling argument is that indemnity plans like Plan 100 also disappeared almost entirely in other firmseven in ones where employees were not offered choices (so selection was not an issue). The old form of FFS insurance was simply an idea whose time had passed. Perhaps the consultants should have known this, rather than going through the complex and time-consuming resuscitation effort; but apparently they did not, or felt that they could not act on this view. The demand shift view is a hypothesis worth evaluating as an alternative explanation of the demise of generous insurance, compared to the story of ubiquitous inefficient death spirals.
Regardless of the specific explanation, our message is clear: sometimes, whether premiums are adjusted to correct for risk selection may be of second-order importance compared to other factors affecting employee health care plan choice. That is, the demise of a generous plan might not be due to adverse selection even when that plan has been observed to be selected by higher-risk workers. Small differences in premiums may lead to large adverse selection effects in theory, but in real-world empirical settings where much is changing, these theoretical effects may be swamped by a shift in preferences adverse to the traditional, generous fee-forservice plan.
Notes
Comments from Leny Bader are appreciated. Opinions are solely those of the authors and not of the institutions with which the authors are affiliated. This research is part of the National Bureau of Economic Research programs on Aging and Labor Economics.
1 While employers, in theory, could charge employees risk-based explicit premiums to avoid this, they almost never have done so, even when not forbidden by law (Pauly 1996) . 2 As Cutler and Zeckhauser (2000, p. 625) note, ''Because so few employers or governments have used formal risk adjustment systems, the relative advantages and drawbacks of different risk adjustment methodologies are unknown.'' And, we might add, even the relative advantages and drawbacks of using risk adjustment at all are unknown. See Inquiry's thematic issue on risk adjustment from Fall 2001 (Volume 38, Number 3) for a discussion of reasons why the use of formal risk adjustment is uncommon. 3 In addition, some plans with small enrollments were offered to employees residing in nearby states, as were some very small HMOs that subsequently exited the regional market. 4 The result was that in 1996, employee out-ofpocket premiums for Plan 100 rose, while they fell to zero or negative values for the HMO options. 5 The employee HMO premiums would have been even more negative if the fixed-dollar model had been followed strictly. 6 Quality of care concerns regarding HMOs raised later by researchers were not an issue at that time. 7 We are not especially concerned with the enrollment patterns in the other health care plans as selection among them was not thought to be an issue by the consulting firms or the employer. 8 In the generalized logit model, we also allow for several varying premium differentials. 9 This possibility is what Cutler and Zeckhauser (2000) call a ''hybrid'' equilibrium.
